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THE RELATIONSHIP OF ANIMAL PROTECTION INTERESTS TO ANIMAL DAMAGE 
MANAGEMENT: HISTORIC PATHS, CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS AND THE 
UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
JOHN HADIDIAN, The Humane Society of the United States, 2100 L Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. 
ABSTRACT: More than a decade ago Schmidt (1989) called for consideration of animal welfare to become a "first-
order" decision rule in wildlife management concerns, including animal damage control. Although there has been 
movement in that direction, this clearly has not yet come to pass. This paper takes a brief look at the interests we call 
animal damage management, animal welfare and protection, animal rights, and environmentalism in order to speculate 
about their shared concerns and the uncertain future before them. Since animal damage and the management of that 
damage cannot be abstracted from the environmental context in which they occur, this leads to speculation that some 
confluence of the interests of animal damage management, animal protection, and environmentalism will lead to a new 
disciplinary focus in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper takes a brief look at the interests we call 
animal damage management, animal welfare, and 
protection, animal rights, and environmentalism in order 
to speculate about their shared concerns and the uncertain 
future before them. More than a decade ago Schmidt 
(1989) called for consideration of animal welfare to 
become a "first-order" decision rule in wildlife 
management concerns, including animal damage control. 
Although there has been movement in that direction, this 
clearly has not yet come to pass. Animal welfare has 
been accepted and centralized in areas where research, 
experimentation, education, and food production are 
concerned, raising the question as to why it has not been 
centralized in animal damage management (Fisher and 
Marks 1996). Answering that question is well beyond the 
scope of this paper, but a brief look at the historic threads 
behind these endeavors can be a start down that road. 
HISTORIC THREADS 
Wildlife Damage Management 
Both wildlife damage management and animal welfare 
interests share the attribute of having only recently 
displayed above-ground growth despite having roots that 
extend deep into the historic past. Wildlife damage 
management is typically regarded as an American 
invention, dating from C. Hart Merriam's tum of the 
century efforts to establish an Office of Economic 
Ornithology as a pillar of goal-oriented research into 
human-wildlife conflicts. But humans were clearly 
dealing with animal damage long before Congress first 
decided to issue an appropriation for it. Conflicts with 
wildlife certainly had to have started as soon as humans 
had settled on a sedentary mode of life, although just as 
certainly we should expect no early record of what must 
have been just a part of daily life. As early as the first 
century AD, however, the Roman historian Josephus was 
describing metal spires put by the citizens of Jerusalem on 
roofs to keep birds from landing there, suggesting the use 
of a technology prominently in use today. The clerics 
of St. Vincents may not have been up on their Josephus, 
432 
Proc. 19th Vertebr. Pest Conf. (R.0. Baker & A.C. Crabb, 
Eds.) Published at Univ. of Calif., Davis. 2000. 
though, since they chose the vehicle of excommunication 
in the late fourteenth century to punish the parish 
sparrows for defecating on the pews (Ryder 1989). This 
was followed a half century later in a protestant ban on 
yet another flock of this species who were condemned for 
"vexatious" chattering and "scandalous unchastity" during 
the delivery of the sermon (Evans 1906). Whatever 
effect these procedures had, unfortunately, bas been lost 
to history. 
While we might find such actions amusing and typical 
of the "quaint" thinking and practices of our ancestors, 
they were administered in apparent seriousness. The 
human-animal relationship in medieval times was 
obviously quite different than now, among other reasons 
perhaps because many people literally lived under the 
same roof with their animals. It was an entirely different 
mind set that led medievalists to hold animals responsible 
for their actions in a way that often mirrored the 
responsibilities discharged on their fellow humans. Evans 
(1906) exhaustively documented the phenomenon of 
formally charging and bringing animals to trial for 
various crimes, and the volume of cases he documents 
suggest this activity was seriously pursued. Still debated 
is whether this activity arose because of a feeling of 
closer kinship to the animals, or simply reflected a fear of 
the unknown and of losing control over natural forces that 
could potentially be overwhelming. By the seventeenth 
century the work of pioneering naturalists such as Francis 
Willoughby and John Ray had opened the door to the 
perception of nature in its own right, rather than in terms 
of analogies and resemblances to man (Thomas 1983). 
This was one of the most profound scientific revolutions 
in human history, but it took the poet in Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge to aptly characterize it when he said: "Nature 
has her proper interest; and he will know what it is, who 
believes and feels, that everything has a life of its own." 
Animal Welfare and Protection 
Human concern over the right and wrong treatment of 
animals also undoubtedly occurs much earlier than 
records attest, and perhaps has always been part of human 
consciousness. Pythagoras (530 BC) argued against 
animal sacrifices and advocated vegetarianism a half 
millennium before the Jerusalem of Josephus was sacked. 
His school reasoned against these acts because of a belief 
in reincarnation, but Plutarch (ca 50 AD) advocated 
vegetarianism on moral grounds as a general duty of 
kindness, and so is noted as one of the very first 
advocates of animal welfare. Others followed. Leonardo 
da Vinci would buy wild songbirds in the market so that 
he could set them free (Ryder 1989), and foresaw a day 
when it would be a criminal offense to conduct 
experiments on animals (Dolan 1999). Francis of Assisi, 
the patron saint of animals, is said to have cut a deal with 
the wolf of Agobio, who had adopted the antisocial habit 
of eating local villagers. The saint negotiated a lifetime 
feeding contract for the predator, perhaps the ultimate 
deal for any species of wildlife, if his predatory 
indiscretions were to stop. The wolf agreed, they shook 
on the deal, and apparently, no more villagers were eaten 
(Ryder 1989). 
The real battle line for forces with opposing views on 
animals crystalized during the early 15th century through 
the writings of Rene Descartes and adherents of the 
Cartesian school, which he founded . The Cartesianists 
felt that animals were no more than complicated 
machines, whose use-or abuse-was irrelevant to any 
consideration of morality. Without the faculty of 
sentience, animals could not be accorded the privilege of 
feelings. This concept was vigorously counter-argued by 
any number of opponents, with sentiments culminating in 
Jeremy Bentham's oft-cited observation that: "The issue 
is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But, can 
they suffer!" (cited in Ryder 1989: 75). The advent of 
the Darwinian era was to answer that question 
conclusively. Sometimes lost in Bentham's argument, and 
others that would follow, was the fact that he was 
concerned with suffering and the infliction of pain, more 
than about death itself. Death was for Bentham an 
irrevocable fact of nature. 
The modern animal welfare movement in America 
dates from the efforts of the New Yorker Henry Bergh to 
halt animal mistreatment, particularly that of the draft 
animals he saw being abused daily throughout the city. 
Bergh started the first animal protection organization in 
the United States, the American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), in 1866. 
Given the authority to pursue cases of animal cruelty in 
New York's courts, it is of some interest to note that one 
of the first cases he brought was against a sea captain and 
his crew who were engaging in the practice, common 
during those times, of catching sea turtles, turning them 
on their back and punching holes in their fins to secure 
them with rope on the deck of the ship. The remarkable 
endurance of these animals meant thflt they would stay 
alive and fresh for much of the long period of voyages at 
sea. The judge considered the case for only a moment 
before throwing it out of court on the grounds that turtles 
were not animals and could not be covered by the new 
animal cruelty law (Zawistowski 1998). 
The idea of animal protection took a dramatic tum in 
the mid-1970s, with the emergence of the field of animal 
rights. Generally dated from the publication of Peter 
Singer's work, Animal Liberation (1975), animal rights 
433 
interests focus on the underlying moral questions and 
issues that surround human use-any use-of animals. As 
Singer notes, if it is morally wrong to treat humans-even 
noncognizant infants or impaired adults-in such a way as 
to cause pain, suffering or death, then it was wrong to do 
the same with animals. The idea of animal rights drew 
heavily from the civil rights and feminist movements of 
the 1960s and was measurably different from earlier 
animal welfare movements, with the notable exception of 
anti-vivisectionism. 
There are sometimes considerable differences of 
opinion and emphasis between animal rights and welfare 
perspectives (Schmidt 1989; Rutberg 1997). The 
principal distinction seems to lie in the fact that advocates 
of animal rights are generally opposed to any sort of 
human use or control of wild animals. Animals are 
viewed as possessing "rights" equivalent to those which 
humans might enjoy, and human domination or control of 
animals as individuals or populations is regarded as 
speciesism, a term coined by Richard Ryder to represent 
the moral equivalent of racism or sexism. Animal 
welfare advocates do not unilaterally oppose all use of 
animals, especially when the overall benefits of engaging 
in exploitive activities outweigh the harm animals endure 
(Regan 1998). A central point for welfarists is that 
animal suffering should be eliminated, preventable deaths 
eliminated and animals always treated humanely; points 
Hooper (1994) confirms in a recent survey as mainstream 
among animal protection and welfare groups. 
Environmentalism 
Environmentalism has it own roots in early 
visionaries such as John Muir and Henry David Thoreau, 
and is undoubtedly, as Roderick Nash points out, 
traceable to " ... powerful liberal traditions as old as the 
republic." (1989:200). For practical purposes, however, 
this interest, like animal damage management and animal 
welfare and protection, can be viewed as a relatively 
recent phenomenon, largely due to the vast impact of the 
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. There are 
many nuances to environmental thinking and 
environmentalists often argue principles among 
themselves, widely differ with and criticize traditional 
ecologists and stand somewhat aghast at the constructs 
advocated by animal welfare and animal rights adherents. 
J. Baird Callicott (1980), a leading environmental 
spokesman, criticized the animal liberationists for their 
"atomistic" (i.e., interest for the rights of individual 
organisms) as opposed to "holistic" (i.e. interest in the 
community) concerns. As Nash (1989) describes it, the 
reaction from animal rights was to characterize the 
environmentalist's emphasis on holism as placing the good 
of the community over the good of the individual, to the 
rights advocates a philosophically untenable stance. Such 
disagreements overlooked the fundamental commitment 
of environmentalists to the concept of ecological 
egalitarianism, whereby an environmental ethic is seen as 
a restraining device on human excesses. This is 
essentially what much of the animal welfare and 
protection community strives to achieve as well- a 
restraint on human excesses. 
It is through embracing the concept of biocentrism 
(Nash 1989) that both proponents of the environment and 
advocates of those parts of the environment that exhibit 
unusually high levels of sentience and sensitivity-the 
animals-should find their common ground. Biocentrism, 
as an appositional concept to anthropocentrism, seeks to 
consider the extension of the rights, privileges, and 
protection that are a given as our moral responsibility to 
fellow humans onto other living things and potentially to 
the nonliving as well. Biocentric thinking incorporates the 
idea of recognizing the rights of every form of life to 
function normally in an ecosystem (Nash 1989), and 
understandably evokes a sometimes extreme response in 
traditional wildlife managers and wildlife damage 
specialists through use of that ever-provocative term, 
"rights" (e.g., Bidinotto 1992). But the concept of biotic 
right is a cornerstone of the land ethic advocated by Aldo 
Leopold (1949), and was apparently long a part of his 
thinking in formulating this thesis. Indeed, a Leopold 
essay written in 1923, but unpublished until 1979, entitled 
"Some fundamentals of conservation in the Southwest," 
went so far into the biocentric camp as to suggest that the 
earth was ". . . an organism possessing a certain kind and 
degree of life." By 1949, Leopold had settled on the 
concept of land rather than earth to express his ideas, but 
his basic point remained intact: the biotic integrity of the 
land should be preserved. 
That the concept of "rights" extends to nonhumans is 
becoming more mainstream, not just in the ivory towers 
of academia where the issue can be debated with a 
minimum of intellectual bloodshed, but in the real world 
where economic consequences obtain as well. The 
landmark case brought by the Sierra Club on behalf of a 
small Hawaiian bird called the palila took on the Hawaii 
Department of Land and Natural Resources in seeking 
protection against the habitat loss that could condemn the 
species to extinction. This case represented the first time 
in American legal history that a non-human stood as a 
plaintiff before the bar (Nash 1989) and it was to the 
benefit of all that the nonhuman won its day in coun. 
Now, with such provocative concepts as biophillia-
defined as human reverence for life and biological 
diversity (Kellert 1996)-increasingly being recognized as 
important organizing concepts for societal action, we may 
already be past the issue of rights and on to new 
challenges. 
CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS 
The role of science in animal damage management as 
a constructive force seems without question to be 
emerging through hard-nosed self-criticism that points to 
the need for more attention to, and rigor in, the 
application of the scientific method to this field. A quick 
look at keynote speeches to the Vertebrate Pest 
Conference suggests the discipline was preeminently 
concerned in the 1970s with the public's opinion 
regarding the methods and techniques used in animal 
damage management and the justification for their need, 
particularly as regards the use of toxicants (e.g ., Swanson 
1976; Momboisse 1978; Dietz 1984). The 1980s and 19'JOs 
show an emphasis on concern for the sort of activism 
arising in both the environmental and animal protection 
camps (e.g., Mccann 1980; Bidinotto 1992; Berryman 
1994). Lately, the focus seems to have shifted toward 
consideration of the growth and diversity of the field 
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(Craven 1996) and the scientific principles and premises 
that establish the field's approach (Dolbeer 1998). 
To many outsiders and some practitioners as well, the 
field appears to need to go back to asking what its basic 
premises are (Bromford and O' Brien 1995; Hone 1994, 
1996). This is especially evident in the fundamental 
questions asked by Hone (1996) about the relationship of 
"pests" to "damage." For example, in collating empirical 
data from 39 studies, Hone discovered that only slightly 
more than half showed a linear relationship between pest 
abundance and damage, a finding that begs questions 
concerning traditional types of assumptions and decisions 
regarding the choice and extent of control measures. 
Animal damage management has to become more attuned 
to and involved with ecological approaches as well. The 
history of ecology is generally mute with regard to animal 
damage management (e.g., Mcintosh 1991), except in 
passing mention on the issue of introduced species. More 
encouraging are recent calls for greater scientific rigor 
(e.g. , Dolbeer 1998), more careful attention to what can 
be called "minimum effective control strategies" (Marion 
1988) or stepwise decision-making approaches (Slate et 
al . 1992) that open the door to greater understanding and, 
perhaps, acceptance of the goals of damage management 
programs. 
DISCUSSION 
Animal damage and the management of that damage 
cannot be abstracted from the environmental context in 
which they occur. Animal damage management is a 
highly applied discipline in which practitioners engage in 
specific goal-oriented activities that address not only 
biological and ecological issues, but social and political 
ones as well. The challenge for practitioners seems to be 
to accept this larger context and work to improve services 
and capabilities, while acknowledging that the available 
biological and ecological information does not always 
point the way with unequivocal certainty to a correct 
"solution." 
The core elements of the sort of inter- and multi-
disciplinary approach needed to deal exactly with those 
concerns have been outlined by Robert Dorney (1989) in 
his discussion of a proposed new field that he termed 
environmental management. Although he died before 
bringing his vision for this profession to fruition, 
environmental management was conceived to be a 
consulting practice that would combine elements of the 
"social, natural, engineering, design, and geographic 
services .. . " working under a shared conceptual 
framework based on ". . . a systems approach, a human 
ecology view, an environmental ethic, and a willingness 
to work for private, government, or community groups in 
a political and legal context. " (1989:5). More than a 
dozen specializations, ranging from hydrologist to social 
scientist might be necessary to function capably in 
environmental management, and there has to be the 
political support and will to see that decisions emanating 
from it are enforced-potentially a tall order. The field 
of environmental management was to be founded on an 
"ethical triad" of reverence for life, for land and for 
biological diversity. To this outsider, this seems like a 
pretty good prescription for some of the headaches animal 
damage management has recently been afflicted with. 
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